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ESTOPPEL-MOTOR VEHICLES ACTE rwin v. Southwestern Inv. Co.' denied the defense of estoppel
to the defendant because the certificate of title involved was
not completed in accordance with Article 1436-1 of the Texas
Penal Code and because the defendant did not reasonably, and in
good faith, rely upon the conduct of the plaintiff. The decision
reversed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals' and affirmed the
judgment of the District Court.
The plaintiff had authorized Dunn, a used-car dealer, to sell
his car. In order to facilitate the sale, he delivered to Dunn his
certificate of title endorsed in blank. The plaintiff refused Dunn's
request to have the transfer on the back of the certificate notarized
until a purchaser was found. Section 33 of Article 1436-1 re-
quires the owner to appear before a notary public and swear to
the transfer before a valid sale can be completed. Going beyond
the scope of his authority, Dunn borrowed $1,540 from the de-
fendant and left the certificate of title as security. Section 51' of
the same article makes it unlawful for anyone to offer for sale or
to offer as security any motor vehicle unless he has in his possession
the proper receipt or certificate of title. Dunn retained possession
1 .---------- Tex .............. 215 S. W . (2d) 330 (1948).
2 Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Erwin, 213 S. W. (2d) 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
3
"No motor vehicle may be disposed of at subsequent sale unless the owner desig-
nated in the certificate of title shall transfer the certificate of title on form to be pre-
scribed by the Department before a Notary Public, which form shall include, among
such other matters as the Department may determine, an affidavit to the effect that
the signer is the owner of the motor vehicle, and that there are no liens against such
motor vehicle, except such as are shown on the certificate of title, and no title to any
motor vehicle shall pass or vest until such iransfer be so executed." TEX. PEN. CODE
(Vernon 1948) art. 1436-1 § 33.
4
"It shall hereafter be unlawful for any person, either by himself or through any
agent, to offer for sale or to sell or to offer as security for any obligation any motor
vehicle registered or licensed in this State without then and there having in his pos-
session the proper receipt or certificate of title covering the motor vehicle so offered."
Tx. PEN. CoDE (Vernon 1948) art. 1436-1 § 51.
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of the car under a trust receipt. An agent of the defendant in-
structed a stenographer to insert Dunn's name as transferee and
sign the notary's certificate as if the plaintiff had appeared before
her. This was done even though the plaintiff was known to the
agent of the defendant. Dunn later disappeared, and the defend-
ant took possession of the automobile as mortgagee under the
trust receipt. Plaintiff sued for conversion. Defendant pleaded.
that the plaintiff had invested Dunn with apparent title and was
estopped to deny the defendant's title. Section 535 states: "All
sales made in violation of this Act shall be void . . ." In line with
previous decisions,' the court held that a person dealing with the
holder of an incomplete transfer of a certificate of title ordinarily
is in no position to plead estoppel against the true owners.
Generally, in order for the defendant to invoke the defense of
estoppel successfully, he must establish that he was damaged
because he reasonably, and in good faith, relied upon the in-
tentional or negligent misrepresentations of the plaintiff.'
Apart from the express provisions of Article 1436-1, on the
facts as understood by the Supreme Court, the defendant was
not entitled to the defense of estoppel. As pointed out by the
Supreme Court, the manner in which the defendant completed the
transfer showed neither good faith reliance on the plaintiff's con-
duct nor equitable conduct on its own part.
5"All sales made in violation of this Act shall be void and no title shall pass until
the provisions of this Act have been compiled with." "[Lx. P EN. COnE (Vernon 1948)
art. 1436-1 § 53.
6McKinney v. Croan, 114 Tex. 9, 188 S. W. (2d) 144 (1945) ; Hoskins v. Carpenter,
201 S. W. (2d) 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)writ of error refused; Elder Chevrolet Co. v.
Baile " County Motor Co. 151 S. W. (2d) 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
7Bynum v. Preston, 69 Tex. 287, 6 S. W. 428 (1887) quoted Bigelow's definition of
estoppel as follows:
" '(1.) There must have been a false representation or concealment of material facts;
(2) the representations must have been made with a knowledge of the facts; (3) the
party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; (4) it
must have been made with the intention that the other party should act upon it; and
(5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it.' Bigelow, Estop. 484." See
also: Collins v. San Antonio Food Products & Produce Co., 188 S. W. (2d) 888 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945)writ of error dism'd.; Noxon v. Cockburn, 147 S. W. (2d) 872 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) writ of error refused; 31 C. J. S. 237 § 59 (1942) ; 2 TEx. Jutn. 490 §
221 (1929).
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The Supreme Court pointed out that they did not intend to
hold that estoppel could never be raised against a claim that the
transfer of the certificate had not been properly executed. To
illustrate a situation where estoppel could be properly applied,
the court cited Wise v. Cain,' in which the plaintiff gave a car
to the defendant and told her to have the transfer notarized, which
she did. Section 339 requires that the owner appear before the
notary public and swear to the affidavit. The court held that
failure to so appear and swear made the transfer false, and the
participating parties were guilty of a criminal offense. However,
the plaintiff was held estopped from asserting the invalidity of
the transfer, as he could not take advantage of his own wrong.
An interesting sidelight to the principal case was the differ-
ence in the interpretation of the facts between the Court of Civil
Appeals and the Supreme Court. The former court stressed the
fact that the plaintiff admitted he wanted to give Dunn all the
authority necessary to make the sale. The Supreme Court held
this was an incomplete statement of plaintiff's testimony and went
on to state that the plaintiff refused to go before a notary public
until the sale was consummated.
Wayne Smith.
8212 S. W. (2d) 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of error refused.
9See note 3 supra.
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